West Virginia v. B. P. J.

11 (Slip Opinion), OCTOBER TERM, 2025

1NOTE: When possible, a syllabus, or headnote, is released with the Court’s opinion, as it is in this case. The syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. The Reporter of Decisions prepared it to help readers. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

1WEST VIRGINIA ET AL. v. B. P. J., BY HER NEXT

1FRIEND AND MOTHER, HEATHER JACKSON

1CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

1THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

1No. 24–43. Argued January 13, 2026. Decided June 30, 2026*

1The issue before the Court in these cases is whether, under Title IX

1and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, schools may reserve women’s and girls’ sports teams for biological females. In other words, may schools base eligibility for female sports on biological sex? In the past six years, 27 States have passed laws reserving female sports for biological females.

1In 2021, West Virginia passed the Save Women’s Sports Act, which bars male students from female teams. W. Va. Code Ann. §§18–2–25d(c)(2)–(3). The law says that biology determines sex. §§18–2–25d(a)(4), (b)(1). The legislature specifically found that barring biological males from female sports is necessary to promote equal athletic opportunities for women and girls. See §§18–2–25d(a)(1), (3), (5). Respondent B. P. J. identifies as female but is a biological male under §§18–2–25d(a)(4), (b)(1). B. P. J. has sought to participate on the school’s girls’ cross-country and track-and-field teams. B. P. J. sued West Virginia and relevant officials, claiming violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U. S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment for the State on both claims. The Fourth Circuit reversed on the Title IX claim and sent the Equal Protection Clause claim back for more fact-finding. 98 F. 4th 542.

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1*Together with No. 24–38, Little, Governor of Idaho, et al. v. Hecox et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

2In 2020, Idaho passed the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, which bars male students from female teams. Idaho Code Ann. §33–6203. The Idaho law says that biology determines sex. Ibid. The law also declares that “separate sex-specific teams furthers efforts to promote sex equality . . . by providing opportunities for female athletes.” §33–6202(12). It recognizes physical differences between biological males and biological females. §§33– 6202(1)–(5), (7), (8), (10)–(12). The law further found that puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones do not reduce the benefit “that natural testosterone provides to male athletes.” §33– 6202(11). Respondent Hecox identifies as female but is a biological male under §33–6203. Hecox played on the women’s club soccer team and tried out for the women’s Division I track and cross-country teams. Soon after Idaho passed the Act, Hecox sued Idaho and relevant officials, claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The U. S. District Court for the District of Idaho issued a preliminary injunction temporarily blocking enforcement of the Act, and the Ninth Circuit upheld that order. 104 F. 4th 1061.

2The Court held:

21. Title IX allows schools to have separate women’s and men’s sports teams based on biological sex. West Virginia permissibly maintained female sports for biological females under Title IX. Pp. 8–14.

2(a) Title IX states: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U. S. C. §1681(a). Two years after Title IX became law in 1972, Congress passed the Javits Amendment. It directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to quickly issue “regulations implementing the provisions of ” Title IX concerning “the prohibition of sex discrimination.” §844, 88 Stat. 612. The amendment also required that regulations for “athletic activities” include “reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports.” Ibid. (emphasis added). In 1975, HEW issued broad regulations requiring schools to provide “equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.” The regulations also allowed “separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.” 34 CFR §§106.41(b), (c). Pp. 8–10.

2(b) In Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title IX regulations, “sex” cannot plausibly mean anything other than biological sex. The ordinary meaning of “sex” at

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3the time of enactment in the early 1970s was biological sex, not gender identity, especially in sports. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson (“sex” is “an immutable characteristic”). Also, the Title IX regulations allowed separate sports teams specifically because biological men and biological women have inherent physical differences.

3B. P. J. agrees that Title IX allows separate female and male teams and permits schools to bar most biological males from women’s and girls’ teams. But B. P. J. argues that schools must make an exception for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones. The wording of Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title IX regulations does not support that argument. Those texts do not address the issue in a way that could properly require schools to allow biological males to compete in women’s and girls’ sports.

3B. P. J. argues that if the regulations let schools limit female sports teams to biological females with no exceptions, then the regulations are not “reasonable” as the Javits Amendment requires. §844, 88 Stat. 612. The Court concludes that separate teams for biological males and biological females are reasonable because of the sexes’ inherent physical differences. When deciding whether the regulations are reasonable, the Court must recognize that competitive sports are distinct and that safety and competitive fairness issues can arise when females must compete against males. In recent years, 27 States and various sports-governing organizations have drawn the same line. Pp. 10–12.

3(c) The Court rejects B. P. J.’s two other Title IX arguments. First, B. P. J. claims the school’s policy violates Title IX because it effectively keeps B. P. J. off every competitive sports team at the school. Although it is unfortunate whenever a student wants to play school sports but cannot, the Title IX regulations guarantee only “equal athletic opportunity.”

3B. P. J. also relies on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1), and Bostock v. Clayton County to argue that Title IX requires schools to allow biological males on female teams. But Title VII and Bostock are not relevant in this very different statutory and factual setting involving sports. Pp. 13–14.

32. West Virginia and Idaho did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by reserving female sports teams for biological females. Pp. 14–25, 27–29.

3(a) The challenged West Virginia and Idaho laws use sex-based classifications by limiting female teams to biological females. Under this Court’s equal protection decisions, sex-based classifications are allowed only when they are “substantially related” to

4achieving an “important” government objective. United States v. Skrmetti (quotation marks omitted). The States argue, and the Court agrees, that safety and fair competition are important interests under equal protection analysis. Limiting women’s and girls’ sports to biological females is substantially related to those interests. See Ibid. Schools may decide eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports based on biological sex. Pp. 14–17.

4(b) Respondents acknowledge that States may exclude most biological males from women’s and girls’ sports because males and females generally have physical differences. The Equal Protection Clause does not prevent States from applying the same rule to all biological males, including those who identify as female. To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, States do not have to compare every biological male’s physical and athletic abilities individually. Under intermediate scrutiny, the “validity of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government’s interests in an individual case.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism. Intermediate scrutiny permits a sex-based classification that, as here, is “not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.” Michael M. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty. (plurality opinion).

4The as-applied argument also fails. That argument says the States’ sex-based classification is generally allowed, but not for biological males like B. P. J. and Hecox who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones. Especially in sports, it would be almost impossible for a judge to fairly determine how puberty blockers and hormones affect transgender athletes and then compare each athlete’s abilities with those of individual biological males and biological females in the relevant sport. Legislatures and schools are better able, and under the Constitution are the more appropriate bodies, to weigh the competing medical and scientific issues and draw proper lines.

4The claim that the challenged laws unconstitutionally discriminate against transgender people also fails. Under Skrmetti, the laws classify people based on biological sex, not gender identity or transgender status. This classification easily satisfies rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 17–24.

4(c) The equal protection challenge here rests on an underlying medical and scientific claim that

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5at least some biological males who identify as female and take puberty blockers or hormones do not keep physical advantages over biological females. That claim is the subject of ongoing medical and scientific debate. Even if the claim is true, it would not change the equal protection conclusion stated above. Pp. 24–26.

5No. 24–43, 98 F. 4th 542, and No. 24–38, 104 F. 4th 1061, reversed and

5sent back to the lower courts.

5Justice Kavanaugh delivered the Court’s opinion. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined it. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch each filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion agreeing with part of the judgment and disagreeing with part, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson also filed an opinion agreeing with part of the judgment and disagreeing with part.

6JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the Court’s opinion.

6Title IX changed American sports and American life. Enacted in 1972, this landmark law promoted equal opportunity for female student-athletes. It has helped women’s and girls’ sports grow greatly over the past 54 years.

6To give female athletes equal opportunity, schools do not simply have, for example, one soccer team, one basketball team, one ice hockey team, and one lacrosse team that are equally open to female and male athletes. Everyone agrees that this approach would deny female athletes equal opportunity because females and males have

7inherent physical differences that matter in athletic performance.

7The “[p]hysical differences between men and women” are “enduring,” meaning they last. United States v. Virginia. These differences include height, weight, strength, speed, endurance, and jumping ability. Thus, forcing female athletes to compete against males can create serious safety risks in contact sports. In virtually all competitive sports, it can also undermine competitive fairness.

7Schools therefore usually have separate women’s and men’s teams to ensure equal opportunity for female athletes. Women’s teams compete against women’s teams, and men’s teams compete against men’s teams. Title IX’s regulations also require schools to give women’s and men’s teams equivalent equipment, facilities, schedules, and similar support.

7In recent years, some biological males who identify as female have sought to play on women’s or girls’ sports teams. This development has caused national and international concerns about female athletes’ safety and competitive fairness, along with concerns about preserving equal opportunities for women and girls to play sports. For these reasons, 27 States, the International Olympic Committee, the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee, and the NCAA have barred all biological males from women’s and girls’ sports.

7These cases involve two such state laws, one from West Virginia and one from Idaho. The Court must decide whether Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause allow schools to maintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females. In other words, may

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8schools use biological sex to decide who may play women’s and girls’ sports? The answer is yes.

8I A Before Congress enacted Title IX in 1972, participation by the two sexes in American sports was very unequal. During the 1971–1972 school year, only about 300,000 high school girls played sports, compared with about 3.6 million high school boys. College sports had a similar imbalance. See NCAA, Title IX 50th Anniversary: The State of Women in College Sports 15, 17.

8The low participation rate among females resulted from open sex discrimination and false stereotypes about American women and girls. Men and boys usually received more encouragement and opportunities to play sports. Male teams also generally received more money and resources. As of 1972, for example, women’s sports reportedly accounted for only 2% of yearly college athletics spending. 130 Cong. Rec. S4601 (Apr. 12, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Stevens).

8In 1972, in a late but historic response to continuing discrimination against women in educational institutions, including athletics, Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. President Nixon signed it. Title IX prohibits “discrimination under any

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81 The plaintiffs, the States, and the United States as amicus curiae, meaning a nonparty offering information to the Court, all agree that these cases do not address a separate question: whether Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause allow schools to permit biological males who identify as female to participate on girls’ and women’s sports teams. That question is currently the subject of litigation in some lower courts. This opinion does not decide it. The opinion also does not address or limit biological females’ participation on male or co-ed sports teams.

9education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” “on the basis of sex.” 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).

9Few laws have affected everyday American life as effectively and significantly as Title IX. Each day, female athletes compete intensely in youth, high school, college, and professional sports across America. About 3.5 million high school girls now play sports. Nat. Federation of State High School Assns., 2024–2025 High School Athletics Participation Survey, p. 57 (Aug. 22, 2025). Another 235,000 women compete in college. NCAA, Title IX 50th Anniversary: The State of Women in College Sports 16–17; NCAA, Sports Sponsorship and Participation Rates Report, p. 94 (Sept. 4, 2025).

9Sports have allowed countless American women and girls to join teams, experience the human drama of athletic competition, overcome painful losses, and enjoy victories. Those lessons and experiences have empowered millions of American women who later thrived in all aspects of American life.

9B In the past several years, some biological males who identify as female have sought to play women’s and girls’ sports. Some of them have taken, as relevant here: (i) puberty-blocking drugs, which suppress the rise of hormones that cause puberty; or (ii) cross-sex hormones and other drugs, including drugs that suppress testosterone or increase estrogen, sometimes called hormone therapy. For simplicity, the Court calls them puberty blockers and hormones. These biological males argue that taking puberty blockers or hormones can reduce the sports-related physical advantages inherent to their biological sex.

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10Strong policy and legal disputes have followed over whether biological males should be allowed on women’s and girls’ sports teams. Many athletic organizations and States have recently acted decisively to bar all biological males from women’s sports, limiting women’s and girls’ teams to biological females.

10In 2025, the NCAA barred biological male students from competing on women’s teams, including those who identify as female and have taken hormones. The U. S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee adopted the same rule, barring biological males from women’s sports. NCAA, Participation Policy for Transgender Student-Athletes (Feb. 6, 2025); USOPC, Athlete Safety Policy §3.3 (June 18, 2025).

10More recently, the International Olympic Committee also limited Olympic women’s sports to biological females. It acted to “protect fairness in such sports and events, as well as safety particularly in contact sports.” The IOC found that biological males have a “performance advantage in all sports and events that rely on strength, power, and/or endurance.” It identified a “20+ per cent” advantage in “most throwing and jumping events,” a “10-12 per cent” advantage in “most running and swimming events,” and a “greater than 100 per cent” advantage in “events that involve explosive power.” IOC, Policy on the Protection of the Female (Women’s) Category in Olympic Sport and Guiding Considerations for International Federations and Sports Governing Bodies 2, 3 (Mar. 26, 2026).

10The IOC also found that “athletes retain Male performance advantage due in part to training effects and fixed traits. There is no current evidence that testosterone suppression or gender-affirming hormone treatment eliminates this advantage.” Id., at 3.

11Most relevant here, during the past six years, 27 States have passed laws that maintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females. These cases involve two of those laws, from West Virginia and Idaho.

11West Virginia has long allowed schools to separate sports teams by sex when players are chosen based on competitive skill. W. Va. Code Rule §127–2–3.8 (2025). In 2021, the West Virginia Legislature passed, and Governor Justice signed, the Save Women’s Sports Act. It bars male students from playing on female teams. W. Va. Code Ann. §§18–2–25d(c)(2)–(3) (2022).

11The law says sex is determined by biology. §§18–2–25d(a)(4), (b)(1). The legislature expressly found that prohibiting biological male participation in female sports is necessary to promote equal athletic opportunities for women and girls. See §§18–2–25d(a)(1), (3), (5).

11B. P. J. is a biological male who identifies as female. In third grade, B. P. J. socially transitioned and began using a new name. Soon after, B. P. J. took puberty blockers to prevent male puberty and, in sixth grade, also began taking hormones.

11Soon after West Virginia passed the law, when B. P. J. was about to enter sixth grade, the middle school principal told B. P. J.’s mother that B. P. J. could not join the girls’ cross-country or track-and-field teams. B. P. J. is now in high school, where the same policies apply.

11B. P. J. sued West Virginia officials and agencies, claiming they violated Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The U. S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia entered summary judgment for the State on both claims, meaning it ruled without a trial. On appeal, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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12reversed the ruling on Title IX and sent the Equal Protection Clause claim back for more fact-finding. 98 F. 4th 542 (2024). This Court agreed to review the case. 606 U. S. 959 (2025).

12While the case continued, B. P. J. competed on the teams. Recently, B. P. J. won the West Virginia Class AAA high school state championship in girls’ shot put and placed fourth in girls’ discus. B. P. J. also won the Region 2 championship in both events. See Supp. Letter of W. Va. in No. 24–43 (May 29, 2026).

12In 2020, the Idaho Legislature passed, and Governor Little signed, the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act. Like West Virginia’s law, it bars male students from female teams. Idaho Code Ann. §33– 6203. The law says sex is determined by biology. Ibid. It also states that separate teams for each sex further efforts to promote sex equality by giving female athletes opportunities. §33–6202(12) (2025). The law further recognizes physical differences between biological males and biological females. §§33–6202(1)–(5), (7), (8), (10)–(12).

12The law also found that puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones do not reduce the athletic benefit that natural testosterone gives male athletes. §33–6202(11).

12Hecox is a biological male who identifies as female and went through male puberty. In college, Hecox began taking hormones. Hecox attends Boise State University, has competed for the women’s club soccer team, and has also tried out for the women’s Division I track and crosscountry teams.

12Soon after Idaho passed the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, Hecox sued Idaho officials and agencies,

13claiming that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause. The U. S. District Court for the District of Idaho issued a preliminary injunction, temporarily blocking enforcement of the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld that order. 104 F. 4th 1061 (2023). This Court agreed to review the case. 606 U. S. 959 (2025).

13The Court first considers the Title IX issue, which only B. P. J. raises in the West Virginia case. B. P. J. argues that the State and school officials violated Title IX by keeping B. P. J. off the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field teams. According to B. P. J., Title IX requires schools to let biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones compete on girls’ teams. The Court respectfully disagrees.

13Congress passed, and President Nixon signed, Title IX in 1972. It says that no person in the United States may, because of sex, be excluded from participation in, denied benefits from, or discriminated against under an education program or activity that receives federal financial assistance. 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).

13When first enacted, Title IX did not specifically discuss sports. Two years later, Congress passed, and President Ford signed, the Javits Amendment. It directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to promptly issue regulations carrying out Title IX’s ban on sex discrimination. §844, 88 Stat. 612. It also required those regulations to include reasonable rules for athletic activities that consider the nature of particular sports. Ibid. (emphasis added).

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14In 1975, following that law, HEW issued broad regulations against sex discrimination in school sports. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128. Most importantly, they required schools to give members of both sexes equal athletic opportunity. They also allowed separate teams for each sex when selection is based on competitive skill or the activity is a contact sport. 34 CFR §§106.41(b), (c) (2025). Contact sports were defined as boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports mainly involving bodily contact. Ibid.

14Those regulations took effect on July 21, 1975, and still remain in force. Because HEW’s interpretation of Title IX was issued contemporaneously with the statute and has remained consistent over time, that interpretation is especially helpful in determining what the statute means. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.

14The question is whether Title IX allows schools to maintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females. The Court answers yes.

14Title IX forbids discrimination based on sex. Its implementing regulations expressly allow schools to have separate teams for members of each sex.

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142 §106.41 states, in relevant part, that despite the requirements of paragraph (a), a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for each sex when selection is based on competitive skill or the activity is a contact sport. Contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports mainly involving bodily contact. It also requires a recipient that operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics to provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.

15§106.41(b). In the 1972 Title IX statute, the 1974 Javits Amendment, and the 1975 Title IX regulations, “sex” can only reasonably mean biological sex. In the early 1970s, especially in sports, the ordinary meaning of “sex” was biological sex, not gender identity. For example, the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson called “sex” “an immutable characteristic.”

15The Title IX regulations also allowed separate sports teams precisely because of the inherent physical differences between biological women and biological men. For example, they allowed separate women’s and girls’ teams when the teams are “based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.” §106.41(b). By mentioning contact sports and competitive skill, the regulations recognized both those physical differences and the safety and competitive fairness concerns that would arise if males competed in female sports. A few years later, Justice Stevens explained in O’Connor v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. 23 that without a gender-based classification in competitive contact sports, there would be a substantial risk that boys would dominate girls’ programs and deny them an equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic events.

15Importantly, B. P. J. does not seriously dispute that “sex” in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the regulations means biological sex. B. P. J. also agrees with West Virginia and the United States, appearing as amicus curiae, or a friend of the court, that Title IX allows schools to have separate female and male teams and to bar most biological males from women’s and girls’ teams. B. P. J. disagrees with them only about

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16whether schools must create an exception to that general rule for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.

16But Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title IX regulations do not say or suggest that schools must let certain biological males participate in women’s and girls’ sports. The statute and regulations also do not say that schools must make an exception for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones. Simply put, their text cannot properly be read to require schools to let biological males participate in women’s and girls’ sports.

16B. P. J. responds with an argument based on the 1974 Javits Amendment. That amendment told HEW to adopt regulations with “reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports.” §844, 88 Stat. 612 (emphasis added). B. P. J. argues that regulations allowing a school to limit women’s and girls’ teams to biological females are not “reasonable” and therefore are unlawful.

16We disagree. Separate teams for biological males and biological females are reasonable. Because of the inherent physical differences between the sexes, limiting women’s and girls’ teams to biological females can reduce the risk of physical injury and ensure fair competition. Some people may prefer a different rule that allows biological males who identify as female to join those teams in at least some situations. But it was “reasonable” for HEW in 1975 to draw a biological line under which biological males play only on male teams and only biological females play on female teams. Even in recent years, 27 States, the NCAA, the USOPC, and the IOC have drawn the same line.

17When deciding whether the regulations are reasonable, we must also recognize that competitive sports are distinct and can create safety and fairness problems when females are forced to compete against males.

17As to safety, allowing biological males on women’s and girls’ teams can create a significant risk of injury to women and girls. These risks are especially serious in contact sports.

17As to fair competition, allowing biological males on women’s and girls’ teams can seriously disadvantage female athletes. Sports are generally zero sum, meaning one athlete’s gain comes at another’s loss. A biological male on a girls’ team necessarily displaces or disadvantages a female athlete by taking her roster spot, replacing her in the starting lineup, reducing her playing time, denying her a medal, or causing similar results. This reality cannot be ignored. It must, and does, guide the meaning of “reasonable” in the Javits Amendment.

17People may debate as a policy matter whether biological males should participate on women’s and girls’ teams. But under Title IX, the legal question is whether West Virginia may limit those teams to biological females. The text and history show that it may.

17C. B. P. J. makes two other arguments related to Title IX that deserve brief discussion.

17First, B. P. J. argues that the school’s policy violates Title IX because it effectively keeps B. P. J. off every competitive sports team at the school. Because B. P. J. has taken puberty blockers and hormones, B. P. J. apparently will no longer be strong or fast enough

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18to compete successfully against boys. B. P. J. also might not want to compete against boys. It is unfortunate whenever a student wants to play school sports but cannot. We understand the desire of every student, including B. P. J., to play and the disappointment of student-athletes who do not make a team or otherwise cannot participate. But the Title IX regulations guarantee “equal athletic opportunity,” not a roster spot for every student.

18Second, B. P. J. relies on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1), and Bostock to argue that Title IX requires schools to allow biological males on female teams. Title VII bans employment discrimination “because of . . . sex,” and Bostock held that this ban forbids firing an employee “for being gay or transgender.” B. P. J. argues that Title IX likewise bars West Virginia’s law because, in B. P. J.’s view, the law excludes B. P. J. from sports based on gender identity.

18We disagree. Title VII concerns jobs, while Title IX here concerns sports, so the factual settings are very different. The statutes themselves are also “vastly different,” as Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed. stated. Title VII generally requires workplaces to treat men and women without considering sex. In sports, however, Title IX allows separate men’s and women’s teams. The question here is therefore whether schools may limit women’s and girls’ sports to biological females. Bostock did not decide that question and expressly said it did not address “bathrooms, locker rooms, or anything else of the kind.” Simply put, Title VII and

19Bostock are not relevant in this very different statutory and factual context.

19In summary, Title IX allows schools to have separate women’s and men’s teams defined by biological sex. Consistent with Title IX, West Virginia has lawfully kept women’s and girls’ sports for biological females.

19III. We next consider challenges to the West Virginia and Idaho laws under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. B. P. J. and Hecox both argue that the States violated that clause by keeping female sports teams for biological females. Again, we respectfully disagree.

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193. After this Court agreed to review the case, Hecox suggested that the case was moot, meaning no longer a live dispute, because Hecox would “cease playing women’s sports in any context covered by” the Idaho law. App. to Suggestion of Mootness, Decl. of L. Hecox in No. 24–38, ¶6 (Sept. 1, 2025). Because Hecox claims the case is moot, Hecox has the “formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the . . . behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.

19Hecox has attended Boise State University since 2019 and remains enrolled. Hecox has played on its women’s club soccer team and sought to try out for its Division I women’s track and cross-country teams. In a 2022 declaration to the Court of Appeals, Hecox said: “I intend to play for the BSU’s Women’s Club Soccer Team this semester, next semester, and through the remainder of my time at BSU.” Decl. of L. Hecox in No. 20–35813 etc., ¶21 (CA9, Sept. 21, 2022) (emphasis added). Hecox expressed a different view about competing at Boise State only in September 2025, after this Court granted certiorari, or review. That change may not last, particularly given Hecox’s prior change in position. See Erie v. Pap’s A. M. Also, actions taken after certiorari that would “insulate a decision from review by this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.” Knox v. Service Employees.

19Hecox is still enrolled at Boise State. Therefore, Hecox’s case is not moot, meaning it remains a live dispute.

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20A. Ratified in 1868, the Equal Protection Clause says that no State may deny “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14. But this command must exist alongside the practical need for most laws to classify people or things for some purpose, which may disadvantage some groups or people. See United States v. Skrmetti.

20Under this Court’s equal protection cases, laws that classify by sex receive intermediate scrutiny. This means a sex-based classification is allowed only if it is “substantially related” to an “important” government goal. See United States v. Skrmetti; United States v. Virginia (Ginsburg, J., for the Court); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan (O’Connor, J., for the Court). The West Virginia and Idaho laws allow separate female and male sports teams and limit women’s and girls’ teams to biological females. That is a sex-based classification, so intermediate scrutiny applies.

20The equal protection questions are therefore: What interests do the States have in keeping separate teams for males and females and limiting female teams to biological females? And is the sex-based classification, which limits women’s and girls’ teams to biological females, substantially related to those interests?

20The States begin with the undisputed point that biological males generally have natural physical advantages in sports, including height, weight, strength, speed, endurance, and jumping ability. See United States v. Virginia (“Physical differences between men and women . . . are enduring”). Therefore, the States argue that limiting women’s and girls’ sports to biological females

21(i) helps prevent serious injuries to female athletes and (ii) protects their opportunities to compete and succeed fairly. More broadly, the States seek to promote “equal athletic opportunities for the female sex,” meaning opportunities for biological women and girls to compete only against other biological women and girls. W. Va. Code Ann. §18–2–25d(a)(5); see also Idaho Code Ann. §33–6202(12) (“Having separate sex-specific teams furthers efforts to promote sex equality” “by providing opportunities for female athletes to demonstrate their skill, strength, and athletic abilities”).

21On safety, the States argue that allowing biological males on women’s teams creates a significant risk of sometimes severe injuries to women and girls. The risk is highest in contact sports such as soccer, basketball, field hockey, lacrosse, and ice hockey. The Court notes that anyone who doubts these are contact sports has not watched a recent game. Safety concerns also exist in sports that appear non-contact, such as volleyball, where spiked balls can seriously injure players, and softball, where line drives can similarly cause significant harm.

21On competitive fairness, the States contend that allowing biological males to play women’s and girls’ sports would put female athletes at a debilitating disadvantage. Sports are generally zero sum: every biological male who makes a team takes a roster spot from a female athlete; every biological male who earns playing time reduces a female athlete’s playing time; every biological male who starts takes a starting position from a female athlete; and every biological male who wins a race takes the gold medal from a female athlete. The States say this remains true even if only one or a few males were to play on a women’s

2217 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

22or girls’ team, because specific female athletes would still face a significant competitive disadvantage.

22Also, making women and girls compete against biological males may discourage some from participating in sports because they reasonably fear serious injury or believe the competition is unfair. The States say this indirect effect of allowing biological males to play women’s and girls’ sports cannot be ignored.

22For these reasons, the States argue, and the Court agrees, that safety and competitive fairness are important interests under equal protection analysis. Limiting women’s and girls’ sports to biological females is substantially related to those interests. See Skrmetti; Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS; Michael M. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty. (plurality opinion). Therefore, schools may reserve women’s and girls’ sports for biological females and may base eligibility for those sports on biological sex.

22B. The plaintiffs again agree that the Equal Protection Clause allows the States to exclude most biological males from women’s and girls’ teams. Their argument is narrower. They say safety and competitive fairness may justify excluding most biological males, but not the relatively small subclass who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.

22The plaintiffs present their equal protection argument in three overlapping forms: (i) as a lack of

23a substantial relationship between the biological-sex classification and the State’s interests in safety and competitive fairness; (ii) as an as-applied challenge, meaning a challenge to how the classification applies in these circumstances; and (iii) as discrimination against transgender athletes. Under this Court’s precedents, none of the three arguments succeeds.

23First, the plaintiffs argue that the States have not shown a substantial relationship between their safety and competitive-fairness interests and the limit of women’s and girls’ sports to biological females. They say those interests do not justify excluding all biological males, including those who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.

23But this Court’s equal protection cases allow general classifications like those in the West Virginia and Idaho laws if there is at least a substantial relationship between the classification and the State’s interests. See United States v. Virginia. Most laws classify for some purpose and may disadvantage certain groups or people. See Skrmetti. The Court has long recognized that classifications cannot and need not be perfect. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (per curiam). Therefore, none of the Court’s equal protection cases involving gender classifications has required a law to achieve its final goal in every instance. See Nguyen.

23Instead, under intermediate scrutiny, which the Court uses in different settings, a regulation’s validity depends on how it relates to the overall problem the government seeks to fix, not on how much it advances the government’s interests in an

2419 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

24individual case. Ward v. Rock Against Racism. Thus, the Court judges the restriction by how it relates to the general problem, not by how much it advances the Government’s interest in one individual case. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.

24Here, the sports setting is again crucial when examining the relationship between the biological-sex classification and the stated interests. Sports differ from ordinary jobs or educational opportunities, where equal protection may often require the government to treat a person without considering sex. In sports, by contrast, everyone agrees that States may maintain separate women’s and men’s teams, and therefore distinguish by sex, because of the inherent physical differences between women and men.

24Importantly, everyone also agrees that when States preserve separate teams for female athletes, they do not have to examine the individual physical abilities of every biological male who wants to join a women’s or girls’ team. Not every biological male athlete is bigger, stronger, faster, or more athletic than every biological female athlete. Some percentage of biological males who identify as male have physical and athletic abilities within or below the typical female range. Still, the plaintiffs acknowledge that States may exclude those biological males from women’s and girls’ sports because of the general physical differences between males and females.

24------

244 That concession shows that the plaintiffs’ argument depends not only on physical ability, but also on gender identity. For example, suppose two boys want to play on a girls’ team. One identifies as male, and the other identifies as female. And suppose both have

25The Equal Protection Clause does not prevent States from applying that same rule to all biological males, including those who identify as female. In the special setting of sports, States may treat all biological males alike and all biological females alike because of the inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females.

25In short, intermediate scrutiny does not require States to compare the physical and athletic abilities of every biological male separately. Intermediate scrutiny allows a sex-based classification that, as here, is “not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.” Michael M., 450 U. S., at 469 (plurality opinion). The plaintiffs next make what they call an as-applied equal protection argument. They say the States’ sex-based classification is generally allowed, but not when applied to biological males such as B. P. J. and Hecox who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.

25But that is basically the plaintiffs’ first argument about whether the laws’ classification is sufficiently connected to the States’ interests, only under a different label. Their as-applied argument assumes that the States’ interests must justify applying the laws to a

25the same size, height, strength, speed, jumping ability, and similar traits. The plaintiffs say schools must let the biological male who identifies as female play on a girls’ team. But schools may exclude the biological male who identifies as male, even if he has the same physical abilities. The plaintiffs’ position therefore depends partly on gender identity, not only on physical ability. In a hard-to-understand footnote, the dissent takes the same position on this issue. Post, at 23, n. 9 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). But the Constitution does not require schools to base eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports on gender identity instead of biological sex.

2621 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

26specific subgroup or person. The plaintiffs’ as-applied terminology and focus on subgroups can help courts analyze the connection between a State’s classification and its stated interests. If the State’s interests do not apply to an especially large subgroup within the class covered by the law, that may show the connection is not close enough. But if the connection is generally sufficient, the Constitution does not require the State to give individual exemptions to particular athletes or subgroups.

26The plaintiffs’ as-applied argument is essentially an indirect demand for strict scrutiny, a test requiring a much closer connection between the State’s classification and its stated interests. But the plaintiffs admit that strict scrutiny does not apply to sex-based classifications. It would be especially unsuitable here because sex-based classifications are permitted in sports, and the only question is whether States may reserve women’s and girls’ sports for biological females.

26Also, especially in sports, an enormous practical and administrability problem would arise if courts

26Footnote separator.

27suddenly had to create such individual exemptions. How would courts decide where to draw the lines? People differ in height, weight, muscle mass, heart capacity, lung capacity, strength, speed, endurance, jumping ability, and many other traits. In sports especially, a judge would find it almost impossible to fairly determine how puberty blockers and hormones affect each transgender athlete and then compare that athlete with individual biological males and females in the relevant sport. Legislatures and schools are better able, and under the Constitution are the more appropriate bodies, to weigh the competing medical and scientific issues and draw suitable lines. No line drawn by the States will please everyone. But courts are not the proper institutions to make athlete-by-athlete judgments that would often be arbitrary and highly intrusive.

27And if the Constitution required individual exemptions based on physical ability, would it also require exemptions for biological males who still identify as male but say they are no taller, stronger, or faster than typical females in their sport? Would those males also have a right to play on a women’s or girls’ team? If not, why not?

27There is no need to discuss this further. In sports, court-managed individual exemptions based on each athlete’s physical abilities could fundamentally undermine women’s and girls’ sports, especially if the number of biological males seeking to participate increases greatly over time. The disputes would be endless and bitter, with few or no principled answers. The Equal Protection Clause and this Court’s precedents do not require courts to enter that judicial quagmire.

2823 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

28Third, the plaintiffs argue that the States’ laws unconstitutionally discriminate against transgender people, specifically biological males who identify as female.

28That argument also fails. Under this Court’s decision in Skrmetti, the laws do not classify people by gender identity or transgender status. 605 U. S., at 517. They classify people by biological sex. In contrast, if a school had a co-ed team but banned every transgender person from it, that would be a separate transgender classification. Unlike the laws in these cases, it presumably would not be analyzed and justified as a classification based on biological sex.

28Even so, if the laws did classify by transgender status or gender identity, this Court “has not previously held” that intermediate scrutiny or another more demanding form of review applies. Ibid. Also, several Members of the Court have concluded that classifications based on transgender status or gender identity should receive only deferential rational basis review, not intermediate or other heightened scrutiny. See id., at 550–553 (BARRETT, J., joined by THOMAS, J., concurring); id., at 566 (ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

28The Court does not need to finally decide in these cases whether rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny applies to transgender classifications. Under either test, the classification here easily passes for the reasons already explained. The States’ interests in safety and fair competition fully justify keeping women’s and girls’ sports for biological females. The Equal Protection Clause therefore allows schools to base eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports on biological sex.

29Finally, the medical and scientific assumption behind the plaintiffs’ entire equal protection argument is that at least some biological males who identify as female and take puberty blockers or hormones do not keep physical advantages over biological females.

29Even if that factual claim is true, it would not change the equal protection conclusion explained above. Under intermediate scrutiny, the connection between the States’ biological-sex classification and their stated interests in safety and fair competition would still be sufficient.

29In any case, that assumption remains disputed in medicine and science and currently has not been settled in the plaintiffs’ favor. States and leading sports organizations disagree with the plaintiffs. They have concluded that biological males still have a physical advantage after taking puberty blockers and hormones. For example, the IOC found that “athletes retain Male performance advantage due in part to training effects and fixed traits. There is no current evidence that testosterone suppression or gender-affirming hormone treatment eliminates this advantage.” IOC, Policy on the Protection of the Female (Women’s) Category in Olympic Sport and Guiding Considerations for International Federations and Sports Governing Bodies (Mar. 26, 2026).

29The plaintiffs respond with their own arguments and studies. But when reviewing state and federal laws adopted during “medical and scientific uncertainty,” this Court has often said judges must be careful before stepping in and striking down those laws. Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 524 (quotation marks omitted). The Court has stressed that legislatures have “wide discretion to pass legislation” in those circumstances. Ibid. (quotation marks omitted). There is good reason for that caution, especially on medical and scientific questions where serious debate

3025 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

30and disagreement. Courts may have difficulty meaningfully judging the carefully considered policy choices of lawmakers who reviewed the medical evidence and scientific data and reached a reasoned decision. See ibid.; cf. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC. When medical authorities and regulators still face “open questions regarding basic factual issues,” there is “little basis for judicial responses in absolute terms.” Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 525 (quotation marks omitted). The “calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted).

30Judicial deference does not mean that courts give up their duty. But the current public medical and scientific record does not definitively establish that the 27 States, the IOC, the USOPC, and the NCAA are wrong in acting on the basis that at least some biological males who have taken puberty blockers or hormones still retain physical advantages over females.

30In these circumstances, the Court again says that the legislative institution is much better able than the judiciary to gather and evaluate large amounts of information, especially on a subject of inherent complexity. Turner Broadcasting. When such disagreements exist, legislatures receive the widest latitude in writing such laws. Kansas v. Hendricks. Put simply, courts should be careful not to rewrite laws in areas filled with medical and scientific uncertainty. Marshall v. United States. That principle applies here.

30To finish discussing equal protection, the Court repeats what it said in Skrmetti:

31This case involves intense scientific and policy debates in a changing field. The voices in these debates raise sincere concerns, and the implications for all are profound. The Equal Protection Clause does not settle these disagreements or let the Court decide what policy it thinks is best. The Court’s role is not to decide whether the law is wise, fair, or logical. It is only to make sure the law does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. Because the Court concludes that it does not, policy questions are left to the people, their elected representatives, and the democratic process. Skrmetti.

31IV. The Court makes two points in response to the dissent. First, the dissent uses phrases against the Court’s opinion such as “contorted logic,” “misguided approach,” “diminished view of equal protection,” and “unencumbered by fact or law.” Post, at 2, 23, 29. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.

31The Court respectfully says that this language is misdirected. Today’s holding is straightforward. The Equal Protection Clause permits schools to have separate teams for female and male athletes. Schools may use biological sex to decide eligibility for women’s and girls’ teams. This policy is constitutionally justified by the vitally important interests in safety and competitive fairness so as to provide equal sports opportunities for women and girls. When a sex-based classification is constitutional, as it is here, States do not have to make exceptions one person at a time. For example, schools do not have to make individual exceptions to allow

3227. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

32certain biological males to compete in women’s and girls’ sports.

32Second, the Court does not accept the dissent’s assumption that only the dissent understands how transgender-athlete disputes affect the people involved. The Court recognizes the difficulties sometimes faced by boys who identify as girls, and girls who identify as boys, in middle school, high school, and beyond. It also greatly admires the desire of all students, including transgender students such as B. P. J., to play sports. But when examining equal protection, the Court must also consider the effects on girls who are forced to compete in sports against biological males.

32Some people may ask what harm comes from letting one more athlete compete in women’s or girls’ sports. Although understandable, that view misunderstands how sports actually work.

32Sports are very competitive and usually zero sum, meaning one person’s gain is another person’s loss. Almost every outcome has a winner and a loser. An athlete who makes a team takes a roster spot another athlete could have had. A player who gets playing time reduces a teammate’s playing time. A player who starts leaves another on the bench. A competitor who wins keeps another athlete from getting that victory, medal, or prize. If an added player causes one team to win, another team loses because of that player. A player chosen for all-conference is selected over someone else. A student who receives an athletic scholarship takes that opportunity from another student. The same is true of other sports opportunities.

32Women and girls who play sports care deeply about all these outcomes. They focus intensely on them and spend extraordinary time and effort training in the heat and in the

33cold. They work out early in the morning and late at night to become a little faster or stronger, jump a little higher, shoot a little better, and watch more video. They make the lonely recovery from an ACL tear and fight for playing time, starting positions, wins, championships, banners, medals, and all-tournament, all-county, all-State, or all-American honors. A championship trophy or all-league award stays forever on a bedroom shelf as a reminder of love for the game and pride in achievement. They learn to accept losses with grace, support teammates, and respect opponents who fairly beat them. They learn to win with class by looking a defeated opponent in the eye, shaking her hand, and praising her effort. Whether they are the team’s star or the last player on the bench, they build lifelong friendships and memories. They value their athletic achievements for years or even decades after they stop playing.

33The two States in these cases, along with 25 other States, the IOC, the USOPC, and the NCAA, currently conclude that women and girls should have these life-changing opportunities on an equal playing field. They should not have to fear physical injury from biological males or be required to compete against them. Consistent with Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, the Court holds that States may maintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females and may base eligibility on biological sex. The Constitution and Title IX do not require women’s and girls’ sports across America to be completely changed.

33The Court emphasizes one final point. Most biological female and transgender student-athletes involved in transgender-sports disputes across the country are teenagers or in their early twenties. They want to play sports. Their desire to compete

3429. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

34deserves respect. No student-athlete on either side of the issue, whether biological female or transgender, deserves to be ostracized or vilified.

34In B. P. J.’s case, the Court reverses the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and sends the case back for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In Hecox’s case, the Court reverses the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and also sends the case back for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

34The Court orders this result.

351. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

35_________________

35Nos. 24–43 and 24–38

35_________________

35West Virginia and others, petitioners in 24–43, v. B. P. J., by her next friend and mother, Heather

35JACKSON

35ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

35APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

35BRADLEY LITTLE, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO, ET AL.,

35PETITIONERS 24–38 v. LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL.

35ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

35APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

35[June 30, 2026]

35The Court correctly holds that neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection Clause bars States from offering separate athletics for each sex. A man has no legal right to compete against women simply because he believes he is a woman. I fully join the Court’s opinion but write separately to make two points.

35First, transgender status is not a suspect class requiring heightened equal-protection scrutiny. See United States v. Skrmetti (BARRETT, J., concurring). The group claiming transgender status could be described more accurately as people experiencing “gender dysphoria,” which is not a “discrete group.” See also Skrmetti (ALITO, J., concurring and concurring in

36judgment). Because “gender dysphoria” is a changeable mental state that is the object of psychiatric treatment, it is unlike the unchangeable characteristics for which the Court’s precedents use heightened scrutiny: race, sex, or national origin. Instead, it resembles other characteristics on the basis of which legislatures may classify with merely a rational basis. See Heller v. Doe (mental illness); Plyler v. Doe (immigration status). Legislatures have many clear rational reasons to keep men who believe that they are women out of teams and private spaces reserved for women.

36Second, as the Court recognizes, this case concerns “biological men” and “boys who identify as girls.” Ante, at 10, 27. Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe they are. Sex is an unchangeable “biological” trait, see ante, at 10; it is binary; and the words “man” and “woman,” and “boy” and “girl,” refer to adults and children of each sex. See A. Byrne, Are Women Adult Human Females? (2020). Using language to hide reality, and thus showing “indifference regarding the truth,” is lying to the public and no longer treating fellow citizens “as equal[s].” See J. Pieper, Abuse of Language - Abuse of Power 17, 21 (1992).

371 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

37_________________

37Nos. 24–43 and 24–38

37_________________

37WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS 24–43 v. B. P. J., BY HER NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER, HEATHER

37JACKSON

37ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

37APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

37BRADLEY LITTLE, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO, ET AL.,

37PETITIONERS 24–38 v. LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL.

37ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

37APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

37[June 30, 2026]

37I join the Court’s opinion and write separately to make two points about Title IX.

37First, Congress enacted Title IX under its Spending Clause power. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed. The Spending Clause does not let Congress regulate conduct. It lets Congress spend money. Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic. Congress may place conditions on the money it gives others. But, as with a contract, a recipient of federal funds must voluntarily and knowingly accept those conditions before they have legal force. Medina; Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman. And

38for a funding recipient to voluntarily and knowingly accept those conditions, Congress must state clearly and unambiguously what conditions the recipient must follow. Medina; Pennhurst.

38Nothing in Title IX clearly and unambiguously tells funding recipients that they may not limit a school-sponsored sports team to biological women or girls. Consider the statute’s language and the evidence of its original meaning. When Title IX was adopted in 1972, it generally prohibited discrimination “on the basis of sex.” 20 U. S. C. §1681. Then, as now, “sex” was commonly understood to mean biological sex. Although Title IX generally prohibits discrimination based on biological sex, Congress stressed that “nothing” in the law “sh[ould] be construed” to forbid separate living facilities for each sex in schools. This shows that separating the sexes is not always discrimination under the statute. §1686. Soon after the law was adopted, Congress directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to issue regulations about athletics. Pub. L. 93–380, §844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974). The agency then issued regulations expressly allowing schools to “sponsor separate teams for members of each sex.” 45 CFR §86.41(b) (1975), as recodified, 34 CFR §106.41(b) (2025). JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo explains that contemporaneously issued and longstanding regulations do not control statutory meaning, but they can provide evidence of it. Taken together, these points support the Court’s conclusion that Title IX does not clearly and unambiguously tell funding recipients they may not sponsor sports teams limited to biological women or girls.

38Second, Bostock v. Clayton County supports the Court’s conclusion rather than weakening it. In that case,

39Page 3 of the opinion, cited as 609 U. S. ____ (2026).

39we considered whether firing an employee for being homosexual or transgender was discrimination “because of . . . sex” under Title VII. Bostock. We accepted two points. First, everyone agreed that firing an employee because of sex is “discrimination” prohibited by Title VII. Second, we understood “sex” in Title VII to mean biological sex. The remaining question was whether discrimination against homosexual or transgender people is discrimination “because of” their biological sex. We held that it is. Biological sex need not be the only cause of the discrimination. It need only be one cause. Discriminating against a person for being homosexual or transgender necessarily means discriminating against that person at least partly because of his biological sex. Bostock.*

39That reasoning fits the Court’s approach today. Title IX prohibits several kinds of discrimination “on the basis of sex.” §1681(a). As in Bostock’s interpretation of Title VII, the Court reads “sex” in Title IX to mean biological sex. The Court also does not question that “on the basis of” may simply mean “because of.” Thus, biological sex does not have to be the only cause of

39*Contrary to JUSTICE JACKSON’s view, post, at 3, the Court’s sex-stereotyping cases use similar reasoning. For example, if an employer fires a female employee because she does not fit a sex stereotype, the employer acts both because of her biological sex and because the employer thinks she defies a stereotype about that sex. Because her biological sex is one reason for the firing, the employer’s conduct implicates Title VII. Bostock; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.

40discrimination, just as Bostock held. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.

40This case differs from Bostock because it presents a question Bostock did not. In Bostock, no one disputed that firing someone because of his biological sex was “discrimination” under Title VII. Here, the question is whether a recipient of federal funds discriminates under Title IX by sponsoring sports teams limited to biological women or girls. For the reasons already given and fully explained by the Court, it does not. Title IX anticipates and approves single-sex living facilities and sports teams in schools. It does not treat them as unlawful discrimination.

40Simply put, Bostock’s holding that firing someone partly because of his biological sex amounts to unlawful discrimination under Title VII does not mean that a single-sex sports team limited to biological women or girls amounts to unlawful discrimination under Title IX. Bostock emphasized this distinction. It said that firing employees because of a trait protected by statute clearly counts as unlawful discrimination under Title VII. But whether other policies or practices are unlawful under Title VII or another law must be decided by examining the policies in question and the words of the relevant law. Bostock also stressed that policies involving “sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress codes” were not before the Court. One might add that school-sponsored sports teams were not before it either.

40I recognize that transgender athletes’ participation in women’s and girls’ sports is intensely debated nationwide. The issues in Bostock were also intensely debated. But there, as here, our task

41Page 5 of the opinion, cited as 609 U. S. ____ (2026).

41is not to settle those debates. It is only to apply faithfully the directions in a federal statute. As in Bostock, I believe the Court does that today and reaches the result required by law.

42Page 1 of the opinion, cited as 609 U. S. ____ (2026).

42Opinion by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR.

42_________________

42Case Nos. 24–43 and 24–38.

42_________________

42WEST VIRGINIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS in 24–43 v. B. P. J., by her next friend and mother, HEATHER

42JACKSON

42On review by writ of certiorari to the United States Court of

42Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

42BRADLEY LITTLE, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO, ET AL.,

42PETITIONERS 24–38 v. LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL.

42ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

42APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

42[June 30, 2026]

42JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, joined by JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON, agrees with part of the judgment and disagrees with part of it.

42Respondent B. P. J. is a transgender girl who wants to live according to her gender identity. When B. P. J. was 11 years old, she wanted to do what she and many other children love: play sports. To do that, B. P. J. had to go to court because West Virginia bans all transgender girls from playing girls’ sports from middle school through college. The State says the ban serves its important interests in keeping girls’ sports safe and preventing unfair competitive advantages. B. P. J., however, argues that neither reason applies to transgender girls like her, who have never

43Opinion of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR.

43gone through a naturally occurring male puberty and who receive gender-affirming treatment. B. P. J. says that, because of both facts, they have no athletic advantage that comes from their sex identified at birth.

43In the five years since the ban began, B. P. J. is the only publicly identified transgender girl in the State who has tried to play sports with other girls. Today, the Court holds that neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection Clause protects her ability to do so. I agree that her Title IX claim fails, but for a narrower reason than the majority gives. On her equal protection claim, however, the majority reaches the wrong answer at this stage of the case.

43The majority applies a form of heightened scrutiny, meaning more demanding judicial review, that is disconnected from this Court’s cases. It holds that the Constitution does not protect transgender girls like B. P. J. who want to play girls’ sports, even if she is right that excluding them does not advance either of the State’s interests. But when a State uses a sex classification to achieve legislative goals, the Equal Protection Clause requires much more. West Virginia might be able to meet those requirements, or it might not. Either way, unresolved factual questions now prevent the Court from deciding the merits of B. P. J.’s equal protection claim. The Court should let the District Court address those facts first. Instead, in an opinion unsupported by fact or law, the majority ends that process too soon and decides that B. P. J.’s case must end now.

43This case involves deeply sensitive, disputed, and changing issues. These circumstances call for judicial restraint, not a rush to answer difficult questions conclusively without enough evidence. The majority instead shows great sympathy for those it favors: young cisgender girls and women who play sports. I share that sympathy. Playing sports can provide benefits that cannot be measured, and

443 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

44Opinion of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR.

44many people understandably care about keeping competition fair and safe. But the majority harms those it disfavors without giving them the fair and full chance to argue their claims that the Constitution requires. I respectfully dissent.

44I. Before addressing this case’s complex legal issues, it is important to understand the case’s history and the people involved. The majority gives too little attention to both.

44A. In 2021, West Virginia banned all transgender girls and women from taking part in school sports for female students. The law, called the “Save Women’s Sports Act,” W. Va. Code Ann. §18–2–25d (Lexis 2022), has the “sole purpose” and “sole effect” of preventing transgender girls from playing on girls’ teams. B. P. J. v. West Virginia State Bd. of Ed., 98 F. 4th 542, 550 (CA4 2024). When the law passed, the District Court found no record of any transgender person participating in school sports in the State. There was not even any record of a “‘problem’ with transgender students playing school sports and creating unfair competition or unsafe conditions.” B. P. J. v. West Virginia State Bd. of Ed., 649 F. Supp. 3d 220, 227 (SD W. Va. 2023). West Virginia has since justified the ban by citing its interests in fair competition and safety.

44The ban replaced a case-by-case policy that had existed since 2016. Under that policy, sports were separated by sex, as they had been for decades. But transgender students could join teams matching their gender identity if their schools “determined that ‘fair competition’ would not be impacted by the student[s’]

44——————

441 Because respondent Lindsay Hecox’s case is moot, meaning no longer a live dispute, see n. 13, below, this dissent focuses on B. P. J.’s case.

45Opinion of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR.

45participation.” 98 F. 4th, at 551. An opposing school could challenge a student’s participation by appealing the school’s decision to the board of directors of the West Virginia Secondary Schools Athletic Commission. The board would then decide whether letting the student play “‘would adversely affect competitive equity or [the] safety of teammates or opposing players.’” It would consider the student’s “‘age,’” “‘athletic experience,’” and “‘strength, size, and speed,’” along with “‘the nature of the sport’” and “‘the degree to which fair competition among high school teams would be impacted.’” Ibid. Some alterations are omitted.

45The ban replaced this individual review with a rule excluding an entire group. Now, every competitive, intramural, and club sport from middle school through college must be “expressly designated as” male, female, or coed based on “biological sex.” §18–2–25d(c)(1). The law defines “‘biological sex’” as an “individual’s physical form as a male or female based solely on the individual’s reproductive biology and genetics at birth.” §18–2–25d(b)(1). Teams “designated” for “females” “shall not be open to students of the male sex” when team selection depends on competitive skill or the activity is a contact sport. §18–2–25d(c)(2). Teams “designated” for “males” do not face the same restriction.

45B. B. P. J. is a teenager living in West Virginia. Her mother calls her “a bright and kind child who cares deeply about her family and friends and excels in school.” 10 App. 4406. B. P. J. is like many teenagers. She is “very passionate about math and science.” Her favorite videogames include Minecraft and Overwatch. She also enjoys jumping on the trampoline, running, playing with her dogs, and spending time with friends. 2 id., at 579.

45B. P. J. is also transgender. Her sex was identified as male at birth, but she has known from the time that she

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46was “very little” that she is a girl. Ibid. After B. P. J. expressed how she felt, her family supported her. She eventually began using a different name and consistently living according to her female identity at home. A little later, she made those changes in every part of her life, including at school. School administrators and teachers worked with B. P. J. and her family to support her social transition.

46When B. P. J. was around nine years old, she was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. This clinical diagnosis means that she experiences significant, continuing distress because the sex identified at her birth does not match her gender identity. APA Brief 8–9. Without treatment, gender dysphoria “can cause debilitating distress, depression, impairment of function,” self-harm, and suicidality. See id., at 10–12; 3 App. 1249. A year after her diagnosis, B. P. J. began puberty-delaying treatment to prevent her body from starting an endogenous male puberty, meaning a male puberty caused by the body’s own hormones. Two years after that, she began taking a form of estrogen to help produce a typical female hormonal puberty.

46When West Virginia enacted the ban, B. P. J. was almost finished with fifth grade and was preparing for middle school. She especially looked forward to joining the girls’ track team and running cross country, as many family members had done before her. But the middle school principal told B. P. J.’s mother that the ban prevented B. P. J. from joining either team. This was so even though everyone who eventually tried out for the girls’ cross-country team made it, 1 id., at 456–457; 2 id., at 730. There were no “cuts,” so this was not a “zero sum” situation, contrary to ante, at 16.

46A month after the ban took effect, B. P. J., acting through her mother, filed this lawsuit. She argued that the ban violates the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. She did not sue because her hormonal therapy meant that she could no longer “compete successfully” on male teams.

47Opinion of Justice SOTOMAYOR.

47Compare ante, at 13. B. P. J. sued because playing sports with boys would conflict with her gender identity. It would also be very harmful to her. Her mother explains that, among other things, it would “further isolate, stigmatize, and erase her.” 10 App. 4408; see also APA Brief 15–24, which notes possible negative consequences.

47The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, a temporary order preventing the State from enforcing the ban against B. P. J. The court found that she had shown the ban was likely “unconstitutional as it applie[d] to her and that it violate[d] Title IX.” 1 App. 439. The State did not appeal. B. P. J. therefore began participating on her school’s girls’ track and cross-country teams.

47B. P. J.’s mother says that B. P. J. “has had the time of her life participating on these teams.” 10 id., at 4406. She has seen B. P. J. make close friends and develop a sense of belonging. Her mother remembers taking her to practice after hours and on weekends and often seeing her practice her form in the backyard “by herself, for hours.” Id., at 4407. Most importantly, her mother says B. P. J. “is the happiest I have ever seen her when she is accepted for who she is and able to participate in school sports.” Id., at 4408. B. P. J. says that “[s]ports are an important part of [her] experience at school,” that she is “so happy to . . . have the chance to participate,” that she has “made so many new friends,” and that she “just want[s] to have the opportunity to [play] school sports like any other girl.” 2 id., at 581.

47Meanwhile, the parties gathered evidence in B. P. J.’s case through discovery. Because of her medical treatment, B. P. J. has never experienced a traditional male puberty or elevated levels of circulating testosterone. She argues that she therefore has no built-in athletic advantage from the sex identified at her birth and that her participation in girls’ sports does not threaten competitive fairness or safety,

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48which are the two reasons the State gives for excluding transgender girls like B. P. J. from girls’ teams. The parties offered conflicting expert testimony on this factual issue. After discovery ended, both B. P. J. and the State asked for summary judgment, a ruling without a trial, and each asked the court to exclude the other side’s expert.

48The District Court granted summary judgment to the State on B. P. J.’s equal protection and Title IX claims. It did not decide the factual dispute over whether her participation in girls’ sports would harm the State’s interests in competitive fairness or safety. See 649 F. Supp. 3d, at 231, noting but not resolving this “debate.” Instead, the court held that the law satisfies heightened scrutiny because it is “substantially related” to the State’s interests in general, regardless of

48--------------

482 B. P. J.’s expert is an endocrinologist at Mount Sinai and a Fellow of the American College of Physicians. His report said that, “based on current research,” circulating testosterone, rather than “[a] person’s genetic makeup and internal and external reproductive anatomy,” is “the primary known biological cause of average differences in athletic performance” between cisgender men and cisgender women. 4 App. 1550. He also said that people who received treatment like B. P. J.’s are “somewhat similarly situated to women with XY chromosomes who have complete androgen insensitivity syndrome,” ibid. That means they have “inactive testosterone receptors” and do not “respond to testosterone.” Id., at 1541. The expert continued that “[i]t has long been recognized” that women with that condition have no athletic advantage. Id., at 1550.

48The State’s expert is a Professor of Exercise Science at the University of Nebraska at Kearney and has a Ph.D. in Health and Human Performance. His report said that athletic “advantages” based on a person’s sex identified at birth have been “shown in children before puberty.” He said those advantages are “magnified during puberty . . . in large part by the higher testosterone concentrations in men, and adolescent boys, after the onset of male puberty.” 6 id., at 2124. He also said that hormone therapy given “after the onset of male puberty does not eliminate the performance advantage that men and adolescent boys have over women or adolescent girls.” Id., at 2123.

49Opinion of Justice SOTOMAYOR.

49whether those interests are advanced as to B. P. J. herself or transgender girls in similar circumstances. Ibid. The District Court then ended the injunction that had allowed B. P. J. to play sports.

49B. P. J. asked the Fourth Circuit for an injunction while her appeal was pending, and the court granted it. This Court denied the State’s request to cancel that order. See 598 U. S. ___ (2023). The next year, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court on B. P. J.’s Title IX claim and instructed it to enter summary judgment for her on remand. On her equal protection claim, the Fourth Circuit held that the unresolved factual dispute prevented a decision at this stage. It therefore canceled the District Court’s summary judgment for West Virginia and sent the case back for more factfinding. 98 F. 4th, at 561–562.

49II. West Virginia classifies people by sex when it separates sports teams according to the sex identified at birth. That classification is subject to heightened scrutiny. West Virginia identifies two interests: ensuring (1) competitive athletic opportunities and (2) safe sports participation for women and girls. As the majority emphasizes, and no one disputes, when it comes to sex identified at birth, males generally have an inherent athletic advantage over females in playing sports. But B. P. J. argues that this general rule does not apply to a specific, easily identified group: transgender girls who have never experienced an endogenous male puberty, receive gender-affirming treatment, and are therefore, she says, similarly situated to cisgender girls. She argues that excluding this group from girls’ and women’s sports does not advance either of West Virginia’s interests.

49The Court should have upheld the Fourth Circuit’s decision to send the case back for more factfinding. By refusing to take this modest step, the majority makes two serious errors. First, the

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50Opinion of Justice SOTOMAYOR.

50The majority concludes that B. P. J.’s claim fails regardless of the unresolved factual dispute over whether transgender girls are similarly situated to cisgender girls for the reasons she gives. That is wrong. This Court’s precedents recognize that factual disputes like this concern how well the classification fits its purpose and whether it survives heightened scrutiny, a more demanding form of judicial review. The majority also suggests that, even if the dispute matters, it involves scientific uncertainty and that West Virginia’s decision is therefore entitled to conclusive deference. The majority again goes wrong by relying on cases that used rational-basis review, citing evidence outside the record, and ignoring important context simply because it is inconvenient.

50This does not suggest what the final result of this case would have been, or should have been, if the majority had allowed the lower courts to make the missing factual findings and correctly apply heightened scrutiny using those facts. West Virginia may well have met its burden and had its ban upheld. The point is that this Court’s equal protection precedents require an approach to B. P. J.’s claim very different from the majority’s approach today.

501 The Fourteenth Amendment says that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” At the center of this guarantee is a simple command: The Government must treat citizens as individuals, not merely as parts of a racial, religious, sexual, or national group. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (some internal quotation marks omitted). The Equal Protection Clause therefore bars state action that denies people “full citizenship stature” or an “equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual

51Opinion of Justice SOTOMAYOR.

51talents and abilities,” because they happen to belong to a class. United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 532 (1996). Everyone agrees that this ban classifies people by sex. West Virginia seeks to separate sports teams only according to each person’s sex identified at birth. Therefore, cisgender girls, whose sex identified at birth is female, may play on girls’ teams, while transgender girls, whose sex identified at birth is male, may not. The difference is unquestionably sex.

51The main question is whether this separation by sex is constitutional. A sex classification like this must survive “heightened scrutiny,” a demanding form of judicial review. J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 136 (1994) (explaining that this review is required because of “‘our [Nation’s] long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination’”). To pass this test, the State must give an “‘exceedingly persuasive justification’” for keeping the sex classification. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 546. This means the State must show “‘at

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52least that the challenged classification serves important government goals and that the discriminatory methods used are substantially related to achieving those goals.’” Id., at 535 (alteration in original; some internal quotation marks omitted). At its core, this test separates laws based on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, abilities, or preferences of males and females from laws based on legitimate state interests that reflect genuine, “‘inherent differences’” between “men and women” that place them in different situations. Ibid.

522 Before this Court, West Virginia argues that its sex classification substantially advances its important interests in competitive fairness and safety in girls’ and women’s sports. But the State admitted below that it has no interest “in protecting one girl’s ranking in any competition or ‘in ensuring that cisgender girls do not lose ever to transgender girls.’” 98 F. 4th, at 560. Instead, the focus is on situations in which transgender girls’ participation is actually unfair or unsafe for others. Ibid. Under that understanding, B. P. J. does not dispute that either interest is important here.

52——————

524 The majority adds a third interest: “provid[ing] opportunities for biological women and girls to compete only against other biological women and girls.” Ante, at 16. That misstates West Virginia’s declared legislative interest. The law aims “to promote equal athletic opportunities for the female sex,” which it defines as “biological females.” W. Va. Code Ann. §§18–2–25d(a)(5), (b)(2). Promoting equal opportunity certainly includes competitive fairness and safety, as West Virginia has argued throughout this case. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 24–43, pp. 17, 39, 44; Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 24–43, pp. 13, 22; see also 98 F. 4th, at 559 (noting that, in the Fourth Circuit, the State had rejected reliance on any interests other than “participant safety and competitive fairness”). Whether competition “only against other biological women and girls,” ante, at 16,

53Opinion of Justice SOTOMAYOR.

53As the majority also recognizes, no one disputes that sorting athletes by sex identified at birth will advance West Virginia’s stated interests in most situations. See ante, at 17. The reason, as the majority explains and B. P. J. does not dispute, is that males and females, as defined by sex identified at birth, have inherent physical differences that generally place them in different situations for many sports. Ibid.; see Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533.

53Even so, B. P. J. argues that West Virginia’s chosen method, a complete ban on participation, does not properly fit those interests. She says the classification excludes a specific subgroup from girls’ and women’s sports even though excluding them would not advance the State’s interests. According to B. P. J., transgender girls and women who receive gender-affirming treatment and have never gone through endogenous male puberty have no inherent athletic advantage and create no safety risks because of their sex identified at birth. She therefore says this distinct subgroup is similarly situated to cisgender girls and women but is still excluded. She argues that this overbreadth violates equal protection.

53Under this Court’s precedents, this claimed factual difference matters to the equal protection analysis, and the lower courts have not conclusively resolved it.

53a This Court has held that a sex classification violates equal protection when there is a mismatch between the —————— is substantially related to promoting equal opportunity, however, is the very question posed by this case, not a separate legislative interest West Virginia has sought to pursue. When applying heightened scrutiny, a reviewing court must “determine whether the [State’s] proffered justification” for a sex classification “is ‘exceedingly persuasive,’” United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 533 (1996), rather than invent circular justifications for the State.

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54sex classification in general and its application to a specific subgroup. For example, in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979), this Court reviewed a New York law that gave an unmarried mother, but not an unmarried father, full power to block her child’s adoption by requiring her consent. Id., at 385–387. The State justified this difference by claiming that, except in special circumstances, a natural mother has a closer relationship with her child than a father does. Id., at 388. The State also said unmarried mothers were easier to locate than unmarried fathers because mothers were “more likely to remain with their children.” Id., at 392.

54But Caban, the plaintiff, did not fit the State’s justification. He was an unmarried father whose relationship with his children was “fully comparable to that of the mother,” so applying the classification to him did not advance the State’s interests. Id., at 389. The Court said that when a father has never come forward to help raise his child, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent the State from denying him the power to block the child’s adoption. Id., at 392. But when “the father has established a substantial relationship” with the child, the State had not shown that using sex had “a substantial relationship to” its justifications. Id., at 393. The Court therefore held that the law, as applied to fathers like Caban, was an “‘overbroad generalizatio[n]’ in gender-based classifications” forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 394.

54A few years later, the Court considered an equal protection challenge to the same New York law. This challenge came from Lehr, an unmarried father who had “never established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with his daughter. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248, 267 (1983). His claim failed because Lehr was “not like the [father]

55Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

55in Caban.” The Court said the Equal Protection Clause therefore did not prevent a State from treating Lehr’s “class” of unmarried fathers differently.

55Together, Caban and Lehr addressed the sex classification’s excessive reach by allowing the State to use it when it actually advanced the State’s interests, as in Lehr, but not when it did not, as in Caban. B. P. J. makes a similar argument here. She says that even if the sex classification substantially advances the State’s interests by keeping cisgender boys off girls’ teams, it does not do so when applied to transgender girls who have never experienced endogenous puberty and who receive gender-affirming treatment. As in Caban and Lehr, it matters whether she is right.

55The Court has also closely examined similar differences in other cases. In United States v. Virginia, the Court considered whether the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI’s) men-only admissions policy was lawful. It held that Virginia could not constitutionally deny VMI’s unique opportunities to women who had the desire and ability to take part, even if “most women” lacked that desire and ability.

55Virginia defended excluding all women by pointing to its “goal of producing citizen-soldiers” and its harsh, demanding “‘adversative method’” of teaching. But excluding women for those reasons relied on a generalization about “‘the way women are’” and, at most, an estimate of what suited most women. The Court held that such classifications could no longer deny opportunities to women whose talent and ability placed them outside the average description. Neither of Virginia’s interests was “‘inherently unsuitable to women,’” and at least a subgroup of women could “‘do well

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56under [the] adversative model,’” would want to attend VMI if given the chance, could perform all activities required of VMI cadets, and could meet the physical standards VMI applied to men. In other words, although the sex classification generally advanced Virginia’s interests in most cases, it did not advance them for this subgroup of women. The Court held that a remedy had to be created for those women, even if they were only a small minority of all women.

56B. P. J. makes a similar claim here. She says West Virginia’s classification may substantially advance the State’s interests in most situations, as was true of most of the women who did not want to and could not attend VMI. But she argues that it does not substantially advance those interests when applied to her subgroup, just as it did not for “some women” who wanted to and could attend VMI. Virginia therefore shows that unresolved factual differences matter, even when they affect only small groups.

56b Whether the connection between the State’s method and its interest is “‘exceedingly persuasive’” also depends on the burdens imposed. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53 (2001), illustrates this point. That case involved a statute classifying people by sex. It allowed citizen mothers, but not citizen fathers, who were married to noncitizens to pass U. S. citizenship at birth to children born abroad. The Court upheld this different treatment. It concluded that the rule advanced the interest in ensuring a substantial parent-child relationship with a U. S. citizen before granting citizenship because mothers, by giving birth, could have such a relationship and indeed

57Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

57likely did have one. By contrast, a citizen father was not guaranteed to know of his parenthood “at the moment of birth.”

57Of course, some citizen fathers knew of their parenthood from the moment their child was born, so the classification did not fit them. Congress addressed those situations by allowing fathers to complete one of three “simple” procedural steps to obtain citizenship for their children: “legitimation, paternity oath, and court order of paternity.” The Court recognized the obligation imposed on a citizen father but found the burden “minimal.” Congress had not created excessive and unnecessary barriers preventing a similarly situated father from obtaining the same benefit for his children as a mother. In that setting, the Court upheld the sex classification even though it did not achieve Congress’s “ultimate objective” in every application.

57By sharp contrast, Caban, Virginia, and similar cases show that classifications may violate the Equal Protection Clause when they use the “extrem[e]” method “of complete exclusion,” even though exceptions for “significant categories,” meaning subgroups, would not endanger the State’s interests. Nguyen upheld the law because it allowed such exceptions. Trimble v. Gordon reached the opposite result. There, the Court found an equal protection violation in a law limiting inheritance by “illegitimate children” from their fathers’ estates because the State “unnecessarily” denied exceptions for “categories” of children whose inheritance rights could be recognized without harming the State’s interests. 430

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58Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

58U. S., at 771. Also, in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U. S. 47 (2017), the Court distinguished Nguyen at least partly because the burden of seeking an exception could not fairly be called “minimal.” The Court held unconstitutional rules requiring unmarried citizen fathers to be physically present in the United States for up to 10 years before passing citizenship to children born abroad, while unmarried citizen mothers faced only a 1-year requirement.

58These cases explain what it means for the connection between the government’s method and important goal to be “‘exceedingly persuasive.’” They show that the presence of clearly identifiable, separate subgroups that do not fit a classification’s generalization can matter in that analysis. If a State includes such a subgroup in an overly broad classification even though exempting it would not unnecessarily endanger the government interest, that may show the classification is based on discriminatory generalizations rather than actually serving those interests.

58——————

585 Trimble involved a classification based on “illegitimacy,” which the Court later clarified is also reviewed under heightened scrutiny, meaning more demanding judicial review. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 461 (1988).

586 To be clear, this analysis does not ask whether an interest is advanced for one individual based on that person’s unique circumstances. It focuses on clearly identifiable, separate subgroups. West Virginia argues that this equal protection theory would let litigants define smaller and smaller classifications until the State had to grant exception after exception to achieve a perfect fit. Brief for Petitioners in No. 24–43, at 43–44. That is incorrect. States may justify systems without some or all exceptions by showing that they did not deny the exceptions “unnecessarily.” For example, an exception might endanger a State’s interest, or “more accurate and impartial lines [cannot] be drawn,” Morales

59Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

59B. P. J. argues that the State’s sex classification fails heightened scrutiny, meaning more demanding judicial review, both because it does not fit her subgroup and because it operates as a categorical exclusion, like the classifications in Caban, Virginia, and Trimble. Unlike Nguyen, there is no procedure she can follow to prove that she is similarly situated to cisgender girls and therefore able to join the girls’ team. The Court’s equal protection cases involving sex classifications have generally considered whether a classification fits separate subgroups and how heavily those subgroups are burdened. It therefore matters whether B. P. J. is right about the problems she identifies. At this stage, the Court needs more facts to decide whether she is correct and whether the State consequently refused her an exception “unnecessarily.”

59Santana, at 63, n. 13. Also, although a State generally cannot justify a sex classification based only on “administrative convenience,” Wengler, the Court has recognized that some levels of administrative inconvenience might help show that the State did not deny an exception “unnecessarily and overbroadly,” Morales-Santana, at 63, n. 13. Whether any of those justifications apply here depends on factual findings that have not been made and, because of today’s decision, never will be.

597 The parties sometimes debate whether an equal protection challenge like B. P. J.’s is “as applied,” meaning focused on particular applications, or “facial,” meaning directed at the classification as a whole. B. P. J. argues that, in most cases, including this one, the difference is mainly “semantics.” Brief for Respondent in No. 24–43, p. 46. Some successful equal protection challenges may make a classification unlawful in every application and therefore resemble a facial challenge. That may happen, for example, when the legislature has identified no important or legitimate governmental interest. See Romer. In other cases, the problem is not the classification itself but its overbreadth or where its lines are drawn. The classification may then constitutionally apply to some people. See Lehr.

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60Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

60a The majority’s analysis begins, and mostly ends, with one premise. It says that, under heightened scrutiny, an important governmental interest needs to be advanced in most, but not all, applications of a classification. Therefore, in the majority’s view, B. P. J.’s identification of some applications that may not advance the State’s interests cannot establish an equal protection violation. See ante, at 18–22. The majority acts as though the Court is debating this issue

60248, 267 (1983), but not to others. See Caban. When narrowing the classification itself could arguably fix the equal protection problem, the challenge appears more “as applied.” Whatever the label, these challenges seek to identify overbroad generalizations and eliminate them to the extent that they violate the Constitution. That is all B. P. J. seeks here.

61Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

61for the first time, or as though B. P. J. is asking for something new. The Court is not addressing this for the first time, and she is not asking for anything new.

61To start, the Court did not impose this limit in either Caban or Virginia. In fact, the dissenting opinions in both cases raised similar arguments.

61Today, the majority says a plaintiff must identify “an especially large subclass” for which the State’s claimed interest is not advanced before a court may find that the classification does not fit its purpose or grant any relief. Ante, at 21. Justice Stevens made the same argument in his Caban dissent. He said the Court wrongly found an equal protection violation merely because the State’s justification was weaker for some indefinitely small part of the disadvantaged class, making the law invalid for that subclass. 441 U. S., at 409. He argued that Caban had not shown that the law’s unjust applications were numerous and serious enough to make it invalid. Id., at 410. Because Caban showed unfairness only to himself and, by implication, to an unknown number of similar fathers, Justice Stevens concluded that Caban had not

61at 314. The majority also relies on Skrmetti for a similar point, but that case used rational-basis review. Id., at 522. The majority then leaves the Court’s equal protection precedents and instead cites First Amendment cases that used different forms of intermediate scrutiny for commercial-speech regulations and restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. See Edge, at 429–430, requiring only a “reasonable” fit; see also Ward. Even under those more relaxed standards, however, a speech restriction cannot “burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s” interests. Edge, at 430. By analogy, the State would appear to fail that standard if it unnecessarily refused an exception for an easily identified subclass when that refusal did nothing to advance its interests.

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62given “sufficient reason” either to invalidate the whole rule or to conclude that applying an otherwise valid rule violated equal protection principles. Id., at 410–412. The Court rejected that argument then. Today, the majority repeats it without crediting Justice Stevens or anyone else. See ante, at 19–22.

62The sole dissent in Virginia made similar objections to the Court’s use of heightened scrutiny. Justice Scalia believed the Virginia majority necessarily found VMI’s single-sex structure unconstitutional because several women, or even a single woman under the Court’s reasoning, were willing and able to undertake VMI’s program. The dissent also said, as today’s majority does, that the Court’s cases do not support invalidating a sex-based classification unless it relates to characteristics that are true in every case. See ante, at 18–19. Arguments that failed before succeed today.

62The majority’s analysis is also unpersuasive on its own terms. Nguyen shows that sex classifications may be upheld even if they are not accurate in every application. But that general statement does not explain what courts should do when there are differences within a group covered by a sex-based classification. Contra, ante, at 21, n. 5. It does not answer whether the State has “unnecessarily” denied exceptions for easily identified “categories” that do not fit the classification. Trimble, at 771. It also does not answer whether exceptions exist and, if they do, what burdens they create. Under intermediate scrutiny, a court should not simply disregard classification errors that may show the State relied on the very kind of overbroad sex-based generalizations that the Equal Protection Clause is meant to eliminate.

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63The majority wrongly rejects the claimed overbreadth because it thinks the subclass is too small to matter. But “the avoidance of gratuitous sex-based distinctions” is a defining feature of equal protection. Nguyen (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Unjustified sex discrimination harms personal dignity no matter how many people it affects. J. E. B. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Allowing the State to classify people by a protected characteristic when doing so does not substantially advance its interests conflicts with the constitutional command to treat citizens as individuals rather than merely as members of racial, religious, sexual, or national groups. Miller. The Court has therefore never required a plaintiff to show that a subclass has a significant size before finding that a sex classification violates equal protection. Contra, ante, at 20–21. Indeed, “virtually every” sex classification the Court struck down in the last quarter of the 20th century was “overwhelmingly, though not perfectly, accurate.” M. Case, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1450 (2000).

63Changing course is especially troubling here. For nearly five years before the State enacted this ban, it allowed transgender girls to participate in girls’ sports in certain circumstances. See supra, at 3–4. Before then, sex-separated sports teams had existed for decades. The ban’s entire purpose and effect was therefore to eliminate any possible exception based on the legislature’s fears, not yet conclusively resolved in court, that transgender student-athletes always threatened competitive fairness and safety in all girls’ and women’s sports. The legislature viewed this step as

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64Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

64necessary, as shown by the Act’s title, to “Save Women’s Sports.” 98 F. 4th, at 550; see also Brief for Petitioners in No. 24–23, pp. 2–3. B. P. J. sued. She argued that the State’s decision to use her sex identified at birth to deny her an opportunity rested on a faulty premise. She maintained that transgender girls who have never experienced endogenous male puberty and who receive gender-affirming treatment do not threaten competitive fairness or safety. Yet the majority says that even if B. P. J. could prove West Virginia wrong, the Equal Protection Clause would have nothing to say about it.

64The majority’s position is therefore fundamentally inconsistent. It accepts the West Virginia Legislature’s concern that transgender girls like B. P. J. form a class large enough to threaten the existence of girls’ sports. At the same time, it holds that the class is too small for protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, the potentially overbroad generalization is treated as both necessary to substantially advance the State’s interests in girls’ sports and irrelevant when deciding whether the classification is lawful. The Court’s equal protection precedents neither require nor support this twisted reasoning.

64Divider.

649 The majority asks whether cisgender men must receive exemptions when their physical traits do not create safety concerns or threaten fairness in girls’ and women’s sports. See ante, at 22. Justice Sotomayor says the Equal Protection Clause does not require those exemptions, at least under the State’s two stated interests here. The State’s interest in “fairness” seeks to remove the athletic advantage inherent in sex identified at birth, not every athletic advantage. So a cisgender boy’s equal protection claim would fail because, even if he is shorter than the average girl, he still has the athletic advantage inherent in his sex identified at birth. The majority wrongly confuses general “physical capabilities,” such as size and strength, with biological athletic advantages arising from sex identified at birth. Ante, at 19– 20, n. 4.

65Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

65b The majority next argues that B. P. J.’s claim treats intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny as the same test. Ante, at 21. It does not.

65First, strict scrutiny requires a “‘compelling government interes[t],’” not merely an “‘important’” interest. Students for Fair Admissions; Virginia. Many laws reviewed under strict scrutiny fail for that reason alone. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Callais; Loving v. Virginia; Vitolo v. Guzman; Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of Defense; see also Students for Fair Admissions, which lists the few interests that have met this requirement.

65Second, under strict scrutiny, a State may use a classification such as race only if it proves that using race is “‘narrowly tailored,’” meaning “‘necessary,’” to achieve a compelling interest. Students for Fair Admissions. If the State can achieve the same interest another way, it cannot use race at all, even if race would work better or cost less in some or even most situations. See, e.g., Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin.

65Intermediate scrutiny, unlike strict scrutiny, permits a State to use a classification when it advances the State’s interests in most cases, even if not every case. The State may then require an individual, as B. P. J. must here, to prove that she does not fit the general rule behind the classification and is actually similarly situated to the people treated differently, as long as that burden is not too demanding. See Morales-Santana. The State may also prove that it did not deny a particular exception

6625 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

66Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

66“unnecessarily,” because granting the exception would threaten the interests the State is trying to advance or would create excessive administrative costs. See n. 6, supra. These features belong only to intermediate scrutiny.

66B The majority moves away from saying the factual dispute does not matter and instead suggests that B. P. J. could not win even if it did matter. The majority points to an ongoing scientific debate about whether transgender girls who have not gone through an endogenous male puberty and who receive gender-affirming treatment have an athletic advantage inherent to cisgender men. It says the Court should be “cautious about swooping in and invalidating laws” amid this uncertainty and should defer to the legislature’s “considered policy judgments.” Ante, at 24–25. Courts applying heightened scrutiny should give deference to the views of legislatures and experts on scientific issues. But that deference is not conclusive, and the existence of a scientific debate does not end the inquiry.

66By taking a different approach, the majority again uses the wrong standard. It relies mainly on cases applying rational-basis review, not heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., ante, at 24–26, quoting United States v. Skrmetti and Marshall v. United States. Its arguments are the same as those it accepted in Skrmetti, where it applied rational-basis review to uphold that law. Compare ante, at 24–26, with Skrmetti, which described how much caution and deference courts must

67Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

67use when entering areas of “‘medical and scientific’” uncertainty in that setting.

67The two tests differ. Under rational-basis review, courts uphold a law if “any reasonably conceivable state of facts” could provide a rational basis for the classification. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. Heightened scrutiny instead requires courts to “closely scrutinize legislative choices” and ensure that the classification properly fits the government’s goal. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.; see also Skrmetti, BARRETT, J., concurring; THOMAS, J., concurring. In Virginia, the Commonwealth relied on a “substantial body of contemporary scholarship and research” to argue that women thrived in a “‘cooperative atmosphere,’” rather than the “atmosphere of adversativeness” that men “‘tend to need.’” The Court did not simply accept Virginia’s view of that research. It held that courts reviewing such “generalizations or ‘tendencies’” must “take a ‘hard look’” to ensure they do not continue “overbroad ‘generalizations’” or “‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.’” Virginia.

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6827 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)

68Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

68The majority’s analysis does not resemble the judicial review required by heightened scrutiny. For example, it says the science “is not settled in [B. P. J.’s] direction at this time.” Ante, at 24. It supports that statement with a study published after oral argument, which is not part of the record before the Court. Ibid. The majority also notes that organizations including the National Collegiate Athletic Association and the United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee adopted policies consistent with West Virginia’s ban. Ante, at 25. But it ignores that both organizations acted after the President issued Executive Order No. 14201, which threatened to remove federal funding from any educational program allowing transgender girls and women to participate on girls’ and women’s sports teams, as

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6811 Earlier, the majority discusses a finding supporting Idaho’s ban. That finding said “the benefit ‘that natural testosterone provides’” remains after transgender girls use “‘puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones.’” See ante, at 7, citing Idaho Code Ann. §33– 6202(11) (2025). But the cited study was later changed after peer review, and the conclusions on which the legislature relied were removed. 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 981, and n. 37 (Idaho 2020) (case below). The study also “did not involve transgender athletes at all.” Id., at 981. Other Idaho findings discussed by the majority, see ante, at 7, cited a different study to support the view that transgender girls keep an advantage over cisgender girls. See §§33– 6202(5), (10). That study’s author later asked Idaho’s Governor to veto the law because the findings misrepresented her work. See 479 F. Supp. 3d, at 981. Trial courts should examine such record-specific issues first when applying heightened scrutiny. These examples also show the danger of giving legislatures effectively conclusive deference when constitutional claims involve scientific uncertainty.

69Opinion of Justice Sotomayor.

69defined by sex identified at birth. 90 Fed. Reg. 9279 (2025). In the case’s current posture, the Court cannot decide whether politics, science, or both caused the organizations to change their earlier policies.

69To be clear, B. P. J. may ultimately fail to show that the science supports her position enough, and this dissent does not assess her chances of winning. West Virginia may be correct that, because of sex identified at birth, transgender girls retain some inherent athletic advantage over cisgender girls even after receiving the hormonal therapy B. P. J. identifies. Everyone also agrees that States have some freedom to make laws when significant and genuine scientific debate exists. But neither the District Court nor the Fourth Circuit has yet evaluated the available evidence or made the necessary factual findings about that debate. Because the facts have not been sufficiently developed, the majority should follow its own advice and be “cautious about swooping in,” ante, at 24. It should not decide this factual dispute in the first instance and in such a hurried manner. A careful approach based on all relevant facts is especially important for a consequential constitutional decision.

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6912 On Feb. 6, 2025, the NCAA announced that its Board of Governors had voted to change its transgender student-athlete participation policy “following the Trump administration’s executive order.” Politico reported a similar change by the U. S. Olympic Committee on July 22, 2025.

7029 Cite this opinion as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026).

70Opinion by Justice Sotomayor.

70In short, Justice Sotomayor says the Court should not have decided B. P. J.’s claim because an unresolved factual dispute could determine the outcome. She says the majority adopts the position that the Equal Protection Clause permits state officials to use sex classifications that significantly burden subclasses within them, even when including those subclasses does not advance the State’s interests and exempting them would not jeopardize those interests. The majority calls its “holding” “straightforward,” ante, at 26, but she says the problem is how it reached that holding: by moving the standards set by precedent and deciding an important, divisive issue without all the facts, even though those facts matter to whether the means properly fit the State’s goals.

70Justice Sotomayor says the majority applies a weakened form of equal protection in the sports setting. It relies on the parties’ concessions that the State’s asserted interests will be advanced in most applications because sex, sports, and those interests are especially closely connected. She hopes this misguided approach does not extend to other settings where any of those considerations are absent.

70Section break.

7013 The majority notes that respondent Lindsay Hecox also brought an equal protection challenge to a similar Idaho ban. Justice Sotomayor says the majority wrongly decides her case instead of dismissing it as moot, meaning no longer a live dispute. Hecox is a transgender college student nearing graduation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 24–38, pp. 118–119. The majority decides her challenge even though Hecox has sworn that she has stopped playing, and will never again play, any sport covered by the ban, and even though she agrees that the favorable decision below should be vacated under

71Opinion by Justice Sotomayor.

71III. Besides claiming that the State’s ban violates the Equal Protection Clause, B. P. J. argues that it violates Title IX. Justice Sotomayor agrees with the majority that it does not.

71First, as the majority notes, ante, at 10, B. P. J. does not dispute that, for this case, “sex” in Title IX means “biological sex,” or the sex identified at birth. See 20 U. S. C. §1681. She also does not dispute that “sex” has the same meaning in the 1974 Javits Amendment, §844, 88 Stat. 612, and its related regulations. Those provisions expressly permit, but do not require, sports teams separated by sex.

71Munsingwear; even though Hecox could not later change her position and challenge the ban, Brief for Respondent in 24–38, p. 17; and even though B. P. J.’s case presents the same issues, allowing the Court to decide them fully without Hecox’s repetitive participation. These facts make Hecox’s case different from Erie v. Pap’s A. M., where the case was not moot because the respondent had made no representations about its future plans and “could again decide to operate” a similar business. Her case is more like Deakins v. Monaghan, which found no live dispute after the respondents said they no longer sought the relevant relief in federal court, and Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, which dismissed a case as moot partly because the respondent dismissed her suit and said “that she w[ould] not file any others.”

71The majority nevertheless fears that dismissing Hecox’s case as moot might “‘insulat[e] a decision from review’” and reward gamesmanship after the Court agreed to hear the case. Ante, at 14, n. 3. Justice Sotomayor responds that review could not be avoided because the same issues were pending before, and have now been decided by, the Court in B. P. J.’s case. Although the majority decides both cases on the merits, see ante, at 14, n. 3, 29, none of its reasoning appears to depend on Idaho’s particular law or the record in Hecox’s case. She says deciding this moot case stretches Article III and accomplishes nothing except unnecessarily prolonging the “harassment” and “negative public scrutiny” Hecox experienced and sought to escape by dropping the case. App. to Suggestion of Mootness in No. 24–38, p. 2a.

7231 Cite this opinion as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026).

72Opinion by Justice Sotomayor.

72The regulations expressly permit, but do not require, sex-separated sports teams. 34 CFR §106.41(b) (2025). B. P. J. also does not seriously dispute that those regulations are lawful. Therefore, although West Virginia’s policy separates sports teams based on sex identified at birth and thus draws a sex distinction, Title IX permits that distinction.

72B. P. J. relies on Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644 (2020). See ante, at 13. Bostock interpreted Title VII and held that when transgender status is a but-for cause of an employment decision, meaning the decision would have been different without it, sex must also be a but-for cause. 590 U. S., at 662. The Court explained that it is “impossible” to distinguish based on transgender status without also distinguishing based on sex. Id., at 660. Because Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination based on sex, Bostock held that it also prohibits discrimination based on transgender status in the workplace.

72The majority correctly says Bostock does not require finding a Title IX violation in this particular setting. See ante, at 13–14. The majority limits its discussion to “the sports context” and says Bostock is “not relevant” to that specific “statutory and factual context.” Given B. P. J.’s concessions, the Javits Amendment and its regulations make this sex distinction, creating sex-separated sports teams, lawful under Title IX. But that does not mean Bostock has nothing to say about Title IX in other settings, and Justice Sotomayor does not understand the majority to suggest otherwise.

7214 The majority reaches this result by saying, rather than merely assuming, that “sex” means “biological sex,” or sex identified at birth, in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and their accompanying regulations, at least in sports. Ante, at 10. Justice Sotomayor says that was unnecessary because B. P. J.’s concessions alone defeat her claim. Instead, the majority could and should have followed Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644 (2020), and simply “proceed[ed] on the assumption” that “‘sex’” in Title IX “refer[s] only to biological distinctions between male and female.” Id., at 655.

73Opinion by Justice Sotomayor.

73Bostock involved two separate questions. First, was sex a but-for cause of the challenged action? Second, did that action constitute unlawful discrimination? Bostock answers only the first question, not the second. A sex distinction does not stop being based on sex merely because the law permits it.

73The facts show the difference. B. P. J. was told that she could not play on girls’ teams because she was identified as male at birth. She would have been allowed to play if her sex identified at birth had been female. Under Bostock, sex was therefore a but-for cause of her exclusion because changing her sex would have changed the decision. See 590 U. S., at 659–660. But Bostock does not decide whether that sex discrimination is unlawful. See ante, at 4 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). B. P. J.’s claim fails on that question because, for the reasons already given, Title IX permits this sex distinction.

73But Title IX applies in many settings outside athletics where it does not allow sex distinctions like this one. For example, schools may not require sex-separated classes or extracurricular activities such as chess club, theater, and student government. 34 CFR §106.34(b)(iii). Title IX also prohibits on-campus harassment, discrimination in admission and expulsion, and much more. See, e.g., §§106.8, 106.21, 106.44, 106.45. Justice Sotomayor does not understand the majority to suggest that schools could completely bar transgender students from certain classes or activities, or, more extremely, expel students because they are transgender, without violating Title IX. Such actions would qualify

7433 Cite this opinion as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026).

74Opinion by Justice Sotomayor.

74as sex discrimination under Bostock. In those settings, just as in employment under Title VII, Title IX would make it unlawful to treat people differently because of their sex.

74IV. The majority ends its opinion by listing the many valuable things sports can offer young people. Sports can build resilience, determination, leadership, and discipline. They can create lifelong friendships, community, and a feeling of belonging. They can bring joy and the excitement of winning, as well as lessons from losing. These benefits are enormous.

74Because of today’s decision, West Virginia and any other state actor may deny B. P. J. and others like her these experiences simply because they believe such students have an inherent athletic advantage, even when the facts show otherwise. In the Court’s view, the facts ultimately do not matter, although the consequences are serious. The ban has no exceptions. B. P. J. cannot even practice on girls’ teams, even if she would not take another person’s place in an eventual competition, even if everyone who tries out makes the team, or even if participating could greatly help treat her gender dysphoria. Sports are often zero sum, meaning one person’s gain comes at another’s loss, but the law does not have to be and should not be. Because the Court wrongly lowers, at least in sports, the burden the Constitution places on state actors that classify people based on sex, I respectfully dissent.

75Opinion by Justice Jackson.

75_________________

75Cases Nos. 24–43 and 24–38.

75_________________

75West Virginia and others, petitioners in 24–43, versus B. P. J., represented by her mother and next friend, Heather

75Jackson

75On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of

75Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

75Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, and others,

75petitioners in 24–38, versus Lindsay Hecox and others.

75On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of

75Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

75[June 30, 2026]

76Opinion of JACKSON, J.

76For purposes of this case, I agree with my colleagues that B. P. J.’s Title IX claim fails. When B. P. J. is placed on a team based on her sex assigned at birth, she is clearly discriminated against because of that sex. But every athlete placed on a team that way is discriminated against on the same basis, whatever the athlete’s gender identity. In athletics, the Javits Amendment and the regulations issued under it allow this kind of sex-based separation: The sexes generally may be separated. This remains true even though Bostock v. Clayton County clearly applies to Title IX. See ante, at 2–4 (GORSUCH, J., concurring); ante, at 31–33 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Under Bostock’s reasoning, B. P. J. is discriminated against based on sex, specifically sex assigned at birth, when she is kept off the girls’ team because she was assigned male at birth. Change her sex assigned at birth to female, and her ability to play girls’ sports changes too. But the same reasoning applies to a boy assigned male at birth. He too is kept off the girls’ team because he was assigned male at birth. Everyone agrees that the Javits Amendment and its regulations allow this kind of discrimination based on biological sex. Still, there is reason to question the concession that “sex” in Title IX means only sex assigned at birth. We have interpreted “discrimination” under Title IX broadly, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., to ensure protection against denial of “opportunities on the basis of gender,” Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed. We have therefore recognized that Congress’s antidiscrimination laws were meant to address “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing Title VII). That is why, in the similar Title VII context, “an employer who”

77Opinion of JACKSON, J.

77“acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender” and therefore has violated the statute. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (plurality opinion). The rule against sex stereotyping cannot be fully explained only by sex assigned at birth. A sex stereotype often relates to a person’s assigned sex, but it does not have to. A transgender woman punished because she is seen as aggressive has faced discrimination “on the basis of sex” just as a cisgender woman has, even if the transgender woman’s behavior matches expectations associated with her sex assigned at birth. In either situation, the institution has imposed gender-based expectations on her. In either situation, the institution may have violated Title IX. The majority is therefore wrong to suggest that “sex” in Title IX “cannot plausibly be interpreted to refer to anything other than biological sex.” Ante, at 10. Title IX allows people to live in the gender they choose. It is concerned not only with sex assigned at birth, but also with whether people can make their gender presentation match, or not match, their gender identity. West Virginia’s law forces B. P. J. to live, and here to play, as a boy even though she is a girl. Properly interpreted, Title IX might well prohibit that law.